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TWEET, POST, SHARE . . . GET HALED
INTO COURT? CALDER MINIMUM
CONTACTS ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL
MEDIA DEFAMATION CASES
Ellen Smith Yost*

ABSTRACT
Modern communication has been transformed by ubiquitous social media platforms and near-universal connectivity. Any individual, from any
location, can now publish speech to thousands or potentially millions of
readers, viewers, or listeners via Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat,
YouTube, and other social media platforms. For this reason, defamation
claims based on social media content are increasingly common. Unfortunately, courts considering these suits lack clear and consistent rules for
when a social media post satisfies “minimum contacts” and “fair play and
substantial justice,” the due process requirements for exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. This Comment clarifies minimum contacts analysis in social media defamation cases by: (1) suggesting
a standardized approach to the Calder v. Jones effects-based personal jurisdiction analysis in social media defamation cases, and (2) identifying
“markers” for finding minimum contacts based on social media posts
alone.
In defamation cases, the most common framework for personal jurisdiction analysis is the “effects” or “expressly-aiming” framework of Calder v.
Jones. The Supreme Court clarified Calder’s requirements in Walden v.
Fiore but did not clarify what contacts would be constitutionally sufficient
in an online defamation case. Currently, courts employ two main approaches to Calder analysis in online defamation cases. This Comment
identifies these as “audience-focused” and “content-focused” approaches.
Because these two approaches can lead to divergent results when applied to
the same facts, the audience-based approach (typified by the Fourth Circuit’s “targeting” test) should be abandoned in favor of a content-based
approach like the Fifth Circuit’s. However, courts should not adopt the
Fifth Circuit’s approach unchanged but should use an objective, text-based
* Ellen Smith Yost, J.D. Candidate 2021, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. 1998,
Duke University. The author would like to thank Schuyler, Ted, and Blake for their encouragement and support, and her father, Mac Smith, for setting a great example and always being happy to talk about the law.
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analysis. Also, courts should reject the “brunt of the harm” standard used
by several circuits in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s sufficient harm standard.
Regardless of which approach to Calder is used, only rarely will social
media contacts alone provide constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts
with a forum state. This Comment suggests, for the first time, three “markers” that may indicate these rare cases. One marker is “doxing” or “doxxing,” in which social media users provide identifying personal information
about a victim. Direct doxing, not sharing or retweeting, is required. A
second marker is the use of “hashtags,” “tagging,” “shoutouts,” or “mentions,” indicated by use of the “@” or “#” symbols. A final marker is the
use of social media platforms with an inherent geographic focus, like
TripAdvisor, Yelp, or Nextdoor. While full Calder analysis will be required to confirm whether exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent
with due process, looking for these markers will help courts quickly identify situations where finding personal jurisdiction is most likely.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

MAGINE you’re at home on a Saturday afternoon, hosting a family
wedding.1 Without warning, your social media feeds flood with
threatening messages from complete strangers. The tweets and posts
say you’re a murderer, a druggie, a left-wing or right-wing extremist.
They reveal your personal information. As the social media threats escalate over the next few hours, police warn you to leave your home. You’ve
done nothing wrong; you’ve simply been misidentified online as the perpetrator of a terrible crime. If you sue the individuals who made these
false and defamatory tweets and posts—bringing a claim in federal court
in your home state, under diversity jurisdiction—will the court find it can
exercise personal jurisdiction based on the tweets and posts alone?
The internet has now been an integral part of American life for more
than twenty-five years.2 Throughout this time, the rules for when a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts have been
murky. More than a decade ago, one legal scholar summarized the rule
for “whether the target [of internet defamation] can [successfully] sue at
home or not” by stating, “[T]here is no clear rule; . . . there is not even
really a clear majority position.”3 In sum, he said, “It depends.”4 Today,
internet communication has been radically transformed by ubiquitous social media platforms and near-universal connectivity. Any individual,
from any location, can publish speech to thousands or potentially millions
of readers, viewers, or listeners via Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and other social media platforms. Yet, in this changed landscape,
the question of whether a court in a defamed individual’s home district
may exercise personal jurisdiction over these out-of-state social media
users remains unclear.5
To help courts and practitioners answer this question, this Comment
analyzes the current law of Calder v. Jones effects-based personal jurisdiction in social media defamation cases. The Comment recommends
standardizing the Calder interpretations to resolve the current circuit split
and inconsistent applications of Calder. It also identifies, for the first
time, “markers” to help courts engaged in Calder analysis identify the
1. This scenario is based on the facts of Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp.
3d 850, 855–56 (E.D. Mich. 2019). See discussion infra Section V.A.
2. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
3. Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L.R. 473, 473 (2004).
4. Id.
5. See infra Parts III, V.
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rare case where personal jurisdiction in a defamation case may be proper
based on social media contacts alone. Standardizing Calder analysis in
social media cases and identifying markers of minimum contacts in this
area will help social media users have fair notice of when their posts will
justify haling them into a distant court. This is the essence of due
process.6
Part II introduces personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, briefly describes
common “frameworks” for determining “purposeful availment” sufficient
for minimum contacts, focuses on the Calder effects framework for finding these contacts, and identifies significant differences between the circuits’ current Calder interpretations. Part III synthesizes current circuit
interpretations of the “expressly aiming” prong of the Calder effects
framework, identifying two broad approaches: “audience-focused” and
“content-focused” tests. Part IV offers suggestions to resolve the circuit
split or inconsistencies in application by standardizing the Calder analysis,
generally and in social media defamation cases. Finding the Fourth Circuit’s audience-focused test and the Fifth Circuit’s content-focused test
each deficient in some way, it recommends adopting a new, objective,
textually based, and content-focused test. Finally, this Comment finds
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based solely on social media contacts is unlikely under either current approaches to Calder or the proposed alternative. Recognizing this, Part V identifies three “markers,”
based on recent cases, that may indicate the relatively rare circumstances
in which social media contacts alone justify the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. These markers are (1) doxing, (2) geographically focused hashtags or tagging, and (3) the use of social media platforms with
an inherent geographic focus, like TripAdvisor, Nextdoor, and Yelp.
Courts and practitioners need this guidance as, in the social media era,
Calder may be a defamation victim’s sole route to finding relief in a local
court.7 Because social media companies cannot be sued based on content
posted by their users, social media cases are more likely than traditional
media or other internet cases to involve only individual, non-corporate
defendants.8 Calder, unlike other frameworks that may readily establish
minimum contacts by a corporate publisher or website owner or operator,
reaches an individual author or speaker.9 Moreover, users of social media
need fair notice about when their social media posts are likely to justify
haling them into court in a distant forum. By helping resolve these issues,
this Comment addresses an important issue in a complex and fast-developing area of the law.
6. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7. See Borchers, supra note 3, at 474.
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”); see, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (interpreting § 230(c)(1) as granting Facebook immunity for suits based
on content posted by users).
9. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984); see also infra Section II.A.
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II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE AND HOW
IT ACCOMMODATES THE INTERNET
AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Personal jurisdiction jurisprudence considers when a court may exercise its judgment over a defendant, consistent with due process.10 Traditionally, personal jurisdiction was based on the physical presence of the
defendant within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.11 As American society developed in size, complexity, and mobility, however, the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington abandoned a requirement
of actual or fictional “presence” within the jurisdiction and announced a
test based on “minimum contacts” and “fair play and substantial
justice.”12
Today, a finding of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
requires considering minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice via one of two alternative analyses: general jurisdiction or specific
jurisdiction.13 General jurisdiction analysis asks whether the defendant is
“at home” in the forum state.14 For an individual defendant, “the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place,” generally the corporation’s place of incorporation or location of its corporate headquarters.15 Outside the “paradigm” fora, only a limited set of extremely
continuous and systematic contacts will satisfy this inquiry.16 A court with
general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may hear any claim
against that defendant.17
Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, is only available if the plaintiff’s claim
against a nonresident defendant “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”18 This Comment is concerned with specific jurisdiction, as general jurisdiction is usually not available over a
nonresident defamation defendant like the one this Comment
considers.19
Specific jurisdiction analysis proceeds in two steps.20 First, the court
10. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
11. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
12. See id. As many prior articles thoroughly discuss the historical background and
subsequent development of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence from Pennoyer
to International Shoe and beyond, this Comment does not duplicate those efforts. See, e.g.,
Erin Belfield, Establishing Personal Jurisdiction in an Internet Context: Reconciling the
Fourth Circuit “Targeting Test” with Calder v. Jones Using Awareness, 80 U. PITT. L. REV.
457, 458–67 (2018); Zoe Niesel, #PersonalJurisdiction: A New Age of Internet Contacts, 94
IND. L.J. 103, 105–14 (2019).
13. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
14. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
15. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“With respect to a corporation,
the place of incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for
general jurisdiction.’” (alteration in original)).
16. Id.
17. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
18. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (alteration in original).
19. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
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examines whether the state’s long-arm statute permits that state’s courts
to exercise jurisdiction over the type of claim asserted.21 Second, if the
long-arm statute does permit jurisdiction, the court examines whether its
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant satisfies due process.22 When
the state’s long-arm statute is coextensive with due process, as are the
statutes of many states (including Texas), the two steps merge into a single due process analysis.23
Many courts apply a three-part approach to specific jurisdiction due
process analysis.24 First, the court assesses whether the plaintiff’s claims
arise out of, or are related to, the defendant’s forum-related activities.25
This is the “relatedness” prong.26 Second, the court considers whether the
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the protections and benefits of the forum state’s laws, such that he should reasonably foresee being haled into court there.27 This is the “purposeful availment” prong,
which determines if the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum
state.28 Finally, the court considers whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable under the circumstances.29 This is the “reasonableness”
prong, which determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies fair
play and substantial justice.30 The analysis commonly proceeds from relatedness, to minimum contacts, to reasonableness, with courts completing each subsequent analytical step only if the prior step is satisfied.31
Because the critical threshold question in an individual defamation suit
is often whether the minimum contacts prong of a specific jurisdiction
due process analysis is satisfied,32 this Comment focuses on common
frameworks for finding purposeful availment and how purposeful availment may be satisfied by social media contacts.
A. FOUR PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT FRAMEWORKS: BURGER KING,
KEETON, ZIPPO, AND CALDER
Courts employ at least four “frameworks for determining whether an
out-of-state defendant’s activities satisfy the purposeful direction require21. Id. In the Second Circuit, personal jurisdiction in defamation cases is often determined by long-arm statute analysis, since New York’s long-arm statute is more restrictive
than due process for defamation claims. See, e.g., Top of Form Penachio v. Benedict, 461 F.
App’x 4, 5–6 (2d Cir. 2012).
22. Revell, 317 F.3d at 469.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2008); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004).
25. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 27; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
26. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28–29; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
27. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28–29; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
28. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28–29; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
29. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 29; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
30. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 29; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
31. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 27–30.
32. See, e.g., Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13–10200–GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *2 (D.
Mass. July 30, 2013).
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ment.”33 Crucially, these frameworks are not alternatives to minimum
contacts analysis.34 Rather, they are alternative methods of conducting a
minimum contacts analysis.35 The frameworks are: (1) continuing relationships with forum state residents (continuing relationships); (2) deliberate exploitation of the forum state market (market exploitation); (3)
“website interactivity”; and (4) harmful effects in the forum state
(effects).36
First, the continuing relationships framework, articulated in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz examines a defendant’s “continuing relationships and obligations with [residents] of [the forum state].”37 The continuing relationships framework is commonly used in contracts-based cases or
where commercial relationships are involved.38
Second, the market exploitation framework, employed by the Court in
the defamation context in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine39 and in “stream of
commerce” products liability cases like J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,40 asks whether the defendant marketed and sold to the forum’s
residents, or otherwise intentionally exploited the forum state’s market.41
Keeton’s version of the market exploitation framework finds minimum
contacts by a publisher when the publication has “regular” and “substantial” circulation in the forum state.42 Courts engaging in Keeton analysis
count how many subscribers live in the forum state.43 But Keeton analysis
will not show purposeful availment by the author whose work was published and circulated—the author and the publisher’s contacts are considered separately.44 For this reason, courts have not used Keeton where the
author posts defamatory content over social media platforms, which, as
noted above, cannot be treated as a “publisher.”45 Arguably, courts could
33. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 905 (10th Cir. 2017).
34. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013)
(noting that “[t]he ‘effects test,’ however, does not supplant the traditional minimum contacts test for purposeful availment”). But see C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs:
The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 622–24 (2006) (noting widespread
confusion in application of Calder’s effects test as it relates to other tests for personal
jurisdiction).
35. See Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex,
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that Calder’s “express aiming” test is not an
alternative to minimum contacts analysis but “merely one means of satisfying the traditional due process standard set out in International Shoe and its familiar progeny”).
36. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
37. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905 (second alteration in original) (citing Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985)).
38. See id., 877 F.3d at 905.
39. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
40. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
41. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 879; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
42. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74, 781.
43. See, e.g., Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 426–27 (5th Cir.
2005).
44. See id. at 425.
45. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018); see, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
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apply Keeton to individual posters, tweeters, or sharers–especially “influencers,” professional social media users with many thousands or even
millions of followers. Courts might reasonably construe influencers as
both “authors” and “publishers” of their online content, finding these social media accounts sufficiently like the magazine in Keeton. Discussion
of this idea is outside the scope of this Comment but merits further
exploration.
Third, the website interactivity framework, also referred to as the
“Zippo sliding scale test,” was articulated in Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.46 This framework considers the degree to
which a website is passive, active, or in-between.47 Courts employing the
Zippo framework find purposeful availment by a website owner or operator, based purely on contacts between the forum resident and the site,
when the site is “active.”48 Active sites solicit detailed information or facilitate online purchases.49 Conversely, a purely “passive” website that
simply places information on the internet for anyone to view does not
constitute purposeful availment of a market where the site may be
viewed.50 For sites falling somewhere in-between the active and passive
extremes, purposeful availment is found on a case-by-case basis.51
Finally, there is the Calder harmful effects framework, also referred to
as the “expressly aiming” framework, which finds personal jurisdiction
where a defendant has “expressly aimed” the conduct at the forum state,
causing harm in the forum state.52 This framework is commonly used in
defamation and other intentional tort cases and is discussed in detail
below.53
Calder, like Zippo, is used in the internet context.54 However, Calder
and Zippo reach different types of internet users. Because Zippo looks at
structural choices made by a website’s owner/operator, such as whether
to allow comments or to use interactive forms, Zippo is only properly
used to determine minimum contacts by a website’s owner or operator—
the party who has made the relevant structural choices.55 Calder, as discussed below, is broader.
46. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
47. Id. at 1124–25.
48. See id. at 1125–26.
49. Id. at 1124.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 907 (10th Cir. 2017).
53. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 908.
54. See Pacheco v. Padjan, No. 16-3625, 2017 WL 3217160, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 28,
2017); Hawbecker v. Hall, 88 F. Supp. 3d 723, 727 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
55. See Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5238GEL, 2005 WL
1500896, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (noting where a party’s contact with a forum arises
through radio broadcasts made available on a website, however, courts recognize that
“[a]lthough there may be interactive elements to the website[ ], the simulcasts of the radio
broadcasts are [a] passive . . . enterprise[,]” and therefore “cannot serve as a basis for
jurisdiction”).
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For this reason, while some courts have used the Zippo analysis alone
or in conjunction with Calder to find minimum contacts by website users,
Calder—and not Zippo—is the relevant framework in social media defamation cases where the user is not the website owner.56 For example,
while Zippo could be used to find personal jurisdiction over Facebook, an
internet company that has made structural and technical choices about
how much interactivity the site will allow, or over a blog owner who sets
up his site to allow e-commerce or comments, Zippo would not give jurisdiction over a Facebook user who merely posts on a page provided by
Facebook and who has made no such structural interactivity choices for
the site.
B. THE EFFECTS FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING PURPOSEFUL
AVAILMENT: CALDER V. JONES (1984) AND
WALDEN V. FIORE (2014)
Calder v. Jones established the effects framework for minimum contacts.57 Calder involved a defamation suit filed in California federal district court by actress Shirley Jones, a resident of California, against the
Florida-based author and Florida-based editor of a scurrilous National
Enquirer article about Jones and her husband.58 Neither the editor nor
the author traveled to California in the course of preparing the story.59
The author, however, “frequently travele[d] to [the state] on business, . . .
reli[ed] on phone calls to sources in California for the information contained in the article,” and made a pre-publication phone call to Jones’
husband in California to read him “a draft of the article so as to elicit his
comments upon it.”60 The editor had only traveled to California twice, on
unrelated errands.61 For the article in question, “he reviewed and approved the initial evaluation of the subject[,] . . . edited [the article] in its
final form. . . . [, and] declined to print a retraction requested by
[Jones].”62 The Enquirer, a celebrity gossip magazine, had its largest circulation in California.63
The Calder court held that the Enquirer’s contacts with California (like
the circulation found sufficient in Keeton, decided the same term) could
not be imputed to its employees.64 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
both employees had minimum contacts with California based on a theory
of “targeting” and “effects” and a fact-specific analysis.65 The California
court, it found, could exercise personal jurisdiction over both
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Pacheco, 2017 WL 3217160, at *3; Hawbecker, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 727 n.1, 729.
See Calder, 465 U.S. at 783.
Id. at 784–85.
Id. at 785–86.
Id.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 785.
See id. at 790. The Enquirer did not challenge personal jurisdiction. Id. at 785.
Id. at 789–90.
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employees.66
As a threshold matter, the Court noted that the author and the editor
were “not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.”67 The author and the editor “knew [the article] would have a
potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the
brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she
lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest
circulation.”68
Next, the Court listed several relevant facts: First, the article “concerned the California activities of a California resident . . . whose . . .
career was centered in California.”69 Second, “[t]he article was drawn
from California sources.”70 Third, “the brunt of the harm, in terms both
of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.”71
“In sum,” the Court concluded, “California [was] the focal point both
of the story and of the harm suffered.”72 For this reason, the author and
the editor each should have “‘reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into
court [in California]’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in
their article.”73 This holding, the Court stated, was based on the effects
the defendants’ Florida conduct had in California.74
In the decades that followed, Calder was criticized. Some found it
“mechanical,” “inflexible,” and insufficiently representative of the effects
test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws on which it purportedly was based.75 Others argued that Calder provided inadequate
guidance about which (if any) of the several factors it considered were
necessary to satisfy personal jurisdiction, or how much weight each factor
should be given.76 Lower courts developed divergent tests for applying
Calder, considering factors or elements including knowledge, intention,
brunt of the harm, effects felt in the forum state, subject of the speech,
and location of sources.77 Despite the criticism, the Calder framework
was frequently used in both traditional media and internet media defama66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 790.
Id. at 789–90.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id. at 790 (quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297).
Id. at 788–89.
See Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit, 47
AKRON L. REV. 617, 634 (2014).
76. See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s
Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once
Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 94 (2004).
77. See infra Section III.A; see also Lee Goldman, From Calder to Walden and Beyond: The Proper Application of the “Effects Test” in Personal Jurisdiction Cases, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 357, 365–70 (2015) (discussing broad vs. narrow interpretations of Calder,
pre-Walden).
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tion cases.78 Courts also employed the Calder framework in cases involving other intentional torts.79
The Court clarified Calder’s requirements in a non-defamation intentional tort context in Walden v. Fiore.80 In Walden, a Nevada federal district court dismissed a Nevada resident’s claims against a Georgia
resident for lack of personal jurisdiction.81 The case involved a Nevada
couple passing through the Atlanta airport en route home to Las Vegas.82
Walden, a local Georgia law enforcement officer working as a deputized
DEA agent at the airport, seized $97,000 cash from the couple’s carry-on
luggage.83 Though the couple explained they were professional gamblers
and documentation of the money’s gambling provenance was subsequently provided by the couple’s attorney, Walden filed an affidavit stating he had probable cause to believe the money was drug related and
subject to forfeiture.84 The money was not returned for more than nine
months.85 The couple sued Walden in federal district court in Nevada,
alleging he violated their civil rights by his initial search and seizure, and
by his subsequent filing of a false affidavit.86
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying its Calder effects test
to the “false probable cause affidavit aspect of the case.”87 Walden, it
held, “‘expressly aimed’ . . . at Nevada by submitting [a false] affidavit
with knowledge that it would affect persons with a ‘significant connection’ to Nevada.”88
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court issued three key clarifications to Calder.89 First, the “proper question [in a Calder framework
analysis] is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way.”90 Second, the contacts giving rise to the claim at issue
must be ones “that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum
State.”91 Third, “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”92 Clarifying this last point, the court continued,
“a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his
78. See Belfield, supra note 12, at 470 (noting that “Calder . . . is especially relevant to
defamation cases involving the internet and social media”); see also Clemens v. McNamee,
615 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010); Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 426
(5th Cir. 2005); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).
79. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014).
80. Id. at 283–86.
81. Id. at 277.
82. See id. at 280.
83. Id. at 279–80.
84. Id. at 280–81.
85. Id. at 281.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 282.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 283–91.
90. Id. at 290.
91. Id. at 284 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
92. Id.
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transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”93
Moreover, the Walden court distinguished the defamation tort at issue
in Calder from other intentional torts. “The crux of Calder,” the Walden
Court clarified, “was that the reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff.”94
Defamation, it emphasized, is unique in its dependence on a reputational
impact and because the injury is held to actually occur wherever the injurious content is published.95 “[B]ecause publication to third persons is a
necessary element of libel, the [Enquirer] defendants’ intentional tort actually occurred in [C]alifornia.”96 Furthermore, “the reputational injury
caused by the [Enquirer’s] story would not have occurred but for the fact
that the defendants wrote an article for publication in California that was
read by a large number of California citizens.”97 In sum, “the ‘effects’
caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the California public—connected the defendants’ conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there.”98 This,
“combined with the various facts that gave the article a California focus,
sufficed to authorize the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction.”99
So Walden draws a key distinction—the alleged tort in Walden did not
take place in the plaintiff’s home state, while the alleged defamation in
Calder did. And Walden leaves open the question of where the floor lies
for effects-based purposeful availment when the tort—as in a defamation
case—does take place in the forum state.100 The Court’s recent decision
in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court does not settle this question, as the intentional tort in that case also occurred outside the chosen
forum state.101
Thus, this question remains open after Walden: When a defamatory act
takes place in the plaintiff’s home state (because published, read, and
understood there) against a forum resident, exactly what kinds of additional facts will satisfy the requirement of minimum contact with the fo93. Id.
94. Id. at 287; see also Goldman, supra note 77, at 373.
95. See Walden, 571 U.S. 287–88.
96. Id. at 288.
97. Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 288.
99. Id.
100. See Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1443–44 (2018) (arguing that because the Walden plaintiffs suffered
the intentional tort in the defendant’s home state and not their own home state, “[Walden
does] not compel a more restrictive approach [than Calder] to determining whether an outof-state defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state in the context of
specific jurisdiction”); Julie Cromer Young, The Online-Contacts Gamble After Walden v.
Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753, 763–64 (2015) (discussing the fact that courts have
continued to apply Calder, post-Walden, in internet contacts cases).
101. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1782 (2017) (noting that “as in Walden, all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred
elsewhere[,] [i]t follows that the California courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction”).
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rum state? Courts currently use a variety of interpretations of the Calder
effects framework, leading to a variety of possible answers.
C. CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF
EFFECTS FRAMEWORK

THE

CALDER

Lower courts employ a variety of approaches for structuring Calder effects analyses to consider Calder’s multiple requirements. Several circuits
interpret Calder as requiring three elements, which can be generally described as (1) an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state,
with (3) knowledge of injury or harm to be felt in the forum state.102
Other circuits apply a more flexible approach.103
Among the circuits using three-part tests, interpretive differences exist.
The Eighth Circuit phrases the second element as “uniquely or expressly
aimed” at the forum state.104 The Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all require that the “brunt of the harm” be suffered in the forum
state, while the Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the “brunt of the
harm” standard and merely requires “harm” suffered in the forum
state.105 The Third Circuit characterizes these same three requirements as
“factors” rather than elements, with “factor two” being the “focal point
of the harm” and “factor three” being the “focal point of the tortious
activity.”106 However, at least one lower court in the Third Circuit has
acknowledged that, post-Walden, the “focal point of the tortious activity”
must be treated as an element and not a mere factor.107
Both in three-part test jurisdictions and flexible jurisdictions, the bulk
of Calder analysis in internet defamation cases involves the expressly
aiming requirement.108 Part III below synthesizes multiple circuit analyses to identify two dominant paradigms for the expressly aiming requirement. Again, each of these approaches is properly understood as a
102. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 907 (10th Cir. 2017);
Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1152 (9th Cir. 2017); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d
785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2010); IMO
Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Miller v. Gizmodo
Media Grp., LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
103. See, e.g., Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010); Young v. New
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002).
104. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010).
105. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 907; IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 265; Gizmodo, 383 F.
Supp. 3d at 1373. But see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme,
433 F.3d 1199, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit appears to join the Ninth in
not requiring the “brunt” of the harm. See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703.
106. Pacheco v. Padjan, No. 16-3625, 2017 WL 3217160, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2017).
107. Id. at *3 (quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 265–66) (“A plaintiff can only satisfy
the effects test by pointing ‘to contacts which demonstrate that the defendant expressly
aimed its tortious conduct at the forum, and thereby made the forum the focal point of the
tortious activity.’ A plaintiff cannot satisfy Calder merely by demonstrating that ‘the harm
caused by the defendant’s intentional tort is primarily felt within the forum.’” (quoting
IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 265)).
108. See, e.g., Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (flexible approach); Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (three-element approach); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)
(three-element approach).
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framework for conducting only the expressly aiming prong of a Calder
analysis, not as a replacement for the full Calder analysis. For this reason,
the three-part test approach is superior because courts using a more flexible approach may neglect one of the prongs.109 Such incomplete analysis
could result in the public or a practitioner misunderstanding Calder’s requirements. It might even lead courts to erroneous results. To help reduce
such error and provide clearer notice of what Calder requires in social
media defamation cases, this Comment attempts next to understand circuits’ underlying approaches to Calder and to recommend a standardized
approach.
III. IDENTIFYING TWO APPROACHES TO CALDER’S
EXPRESSLY AIMING PRONG: AUDIENCE-FOCUSED
AND CONTENT-FOCUSED TESTS
This Part identifies two common expressly aiming paradigms currently
in use, drawn from multiple circuits’ Calder tests. The Comment christens
these approaches “audience-focused tests” and “content-focused tests.”
Neither approach precisely aligns with the standardized approach this
Comment recommends in Part IV, though the content-focused approach
comes close. Understanding these two approaches and how they diverge
reveals key differences in what courts currently consider in Calder analysis and how courts using these different approaches may reach different
personal jurisdiction conclusions given similar facts.
First is the audience-focused approach, in which courts focus on the
communication’s intended readers. Audience-focused tests key off Calder’s emphasis on the fact that the author and the editor “knew that the
brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the [forum state]”
because that was where the magazine’s interested audience was
concentrated.110
An example of an audience-focused test is the Fourth Circuit’s “targeting” test for Calder analysis in the internet defamation context. This test
was developed in Young v. New Haven Advocate.111 In Young, the court
held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over local Connecticut
newspapers for articles they published on their websites about Connecticut prisoners housed in Virginia prisons, though the articles were accessed and read in Virginia and allegedly defamed a Virginia resident, the
prison warden.112 The crux of the analysis, the court said, was whether
the newspaper intended to target an audience in the forum state, not
whether the content was available to internet readers in the forum state
and caused reputational harm in the forum state.113 Because the newspa109. See, e.g., Pacheco, 2017 WL 3217160, at *5 (incorrectly substituting the Fourth Circuit’s “targeting” test for a full, three-prong Calder analysis).
110. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984).
111. 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
112. Id. at 263–64.
113. Id.
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pers in Young were local—focusing on local stories and catering to local
subscribers—Connecticut readers and not Virginia readers were the target audience.114
The targeting test has been criticized as inconsistent with Calder.115
The criticism is that the test deemphasizes Calder’s effects requirement
by focusing exclusively on the intended connection between the content
and the forum state.116 But understood as a framework for only the expressly aiming prong of the three-prong Calder analysis (requiring an intentional act, expressly aimed at the forum state, with knowledge of
injury or harm to be felt in the forum state), there is no inconsistency
between Calder and the targeting test.117
Courts in the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have used similar
audience-focused tests or have followed Young.118 At least one lower
court in the Third Circuit has specifically approved Young.119 The Eighth
Circuit’s “Uniquely or Expressly Aiming” requirement functions like the
targeting test by focusing on where the interested audience of a website
posting was concentrated.120 Similarly, courts in the First Circuit have
emphasized determining where the author “intended [the effect of the
statements] to be felt.”121 Like the Young test, this puts the focus on the
intended recipient of the speech.
Next are content-focused tests, in which courts analyzing Calder’s expressly aiming prong focus on the text itself rather than its intended audience.122 Courts using this approach key into Calder’s requirement that
the forum state be the “focal point . . . of the story.”123 This type of analysis gives primacy to whether the forum state, or possibly the defendant’s
114. Id.
115. See Belfield, supra note 12, at 476–77; Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong
Target: The “Audience Targeting” Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation
Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 542–44 (2012).
116. See Belfield, supra note 12, at 476–77; Ludington, supra note 115.
117. Effects should be considered in the injury/harm prong. Unfortunately, the Fourth
Circuit’s approach in Young has sometimes been applied in place of the full Calder analysis, rather than as only a framework for the expressly aiming prong. See, e.g., Pacheco v.
Padjan, No. 16-3625, 2017 WL 3217160, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2017) (“There is no single
formula for triggering a personal jurisdiction finding under Calder. A plaintiff can demonstrate that an Internet post targeted a specific forum by, for example, demonstrating that
(i) that the website itself focused on a specific geographic area or (ii) the content of the
post targeted a specific geographic area.”).
118. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004);
Pacheco, 2017 WL 3217160, at *5; Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155CV-S-BP, 2018 WL 3676962, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2018); Cohane v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, No. 14–10494–RGS, 2014 WL 1820782, at *3 (D. Mass. May 8, 2014).
119. See, e.g., Pacheco, 2017 WL 3217160, at *5.
120. See Bigfoot on the Strip, 2018 WL 3676962, at *3.
121. See, e.g., Cohane, 2014 WL 1820782, at *3 (“In the context of a defamation claim,
‘purposeful availment’ is determined by where the effects of the defamatory statements are
intended to be felt.” (quoting Calder v. Jones, 456 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984))); Plixer Int’l,
Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 293 F. Supp. 3d 232, 238 (D. Me. 2017), aff’d, 905 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2018) (“[T]he focus is on the defendant’s intentions.” (internal quotation omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010); Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2005).
123. See, e.g., Fielding, 415 F.3d at 426–27. See generally Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
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activities in the forum state, is the actual focus of the text.124 It considers
whether the forum state is mentioned or discussed—and if so, how prominently.125 Content-focused courts may consider the intended audience of
the speech in Calder’s effects prong.126
An example of this approach is the Fifth Circuit’s “subject and sources”
test.127 While this test technically has two parts, courts emphasize the subject prong.128 Furthermore, in social media cases (unlike traditional internet media cases), the informal nature of the medium means a person
who tweets, posts, or shares is unlikely to conduct interviews and research
before doing so and there will commonly be no “sources” to consider.129
For this reason, in social media defamation cases, this test turns entirely
on the “subject” prong.130
The Fifth Circuit applied this content-based test in Clemens v. McNamee.131 Clemens involved a defamation claim brought by professional
baseball player Roger Clemens against Brian McNamee, his former
trainer.132 McNamee told federal authorities and a government commission investigating the use of performance enhancing drugs in baseball
that, on three occasions, he had injected Clemens with performance enhancing drugs.133 McNamee’s statements were published in a Congressional report and reprinted by “every national news service” in the
country “as well as every major newspaper in Texas.”134 McNamee also
repeated his statements to a reporter for Sports Illustrated’s website,
SI.com, which carried the story.135 McNamee made the statements in
New York City.136 The alleged injections took place in Toronto and New
York.137 Clemens was a well-known resident of Houston, Texas, and
brought suit in Texas.138
Considering “whether these defamatory remarks constituted purposeful availment such that McNamee could have reasonably anticipated
being haled into a Texas court as a result of his statements,” the court
found they did not.139 McNamee’s statements, the court found, were not
124. See, e.g., Fielding, 415 F.3d at 426–27.
125. See Robert J. Condlin, supra note 76, at 143 n.566.
126. See Clemens, 615 F.3d at 380.
127. See Fielding, 415 F.3d at 426 (“[T]o exercise specific jurisdiction in a libel action,
the ‘aim’ of the plaintiff under the Calder test must be demonstrated by showing that (1)
the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the article were in the forum
state.”); see also Alexandra Wilson Albright, Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APP. ADVOC. 9, 38
n.118 (2017) (using the “subject and sources” nomenclature).
128. See Clemens, 615 F.3d at 380.
129. See Hawbecker v. Hall, 88 F. Supp. 3d 723, 728 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
130. See id.
131. 615 F.3d at 376.
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 379–80.
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focused on Texas.140 “[T]he statements did not concern activity in Texas;
nor were they made in Texas or directed to Texas residents any more than
residents of any state.”141 Specifically, the court emphasized, they “concerned non-Texas activities—the delivery of performance-enhancing
drugs to Clemens in New York and Canada.”142
At bottom, for the Clemens court, the key question was where the activities described in the text took place.143 If the activities discussed did
not take place in the forum state, the forum state was not the article’s
subject.144 This turns therefore not on who the author intended to read
the content, but what words the author chose to include—what activities
the author described. Therefore, the test is content based.
Naturally, courts using these two approaches do not consider only audience or content in their Calder analyses. Courts also mix in consideration
of the other factors.145 However, courts appear to give greater weight to
different factors under each approach.146 Understanding the audiencebased and content-based approaches to the expressly aiming prong of the
Calder analysis helps courts and practitioners grasp which factors may
weigh most heavily in the court’s analysis. Even more helpful would be
adopting a standardized approach to the analysis, as the next Part
proposes.
IV. STANDARDIZING CALDER ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
DEFAMATION CASES TO INCREASE CONSISTENCY
AND SERVE JUDICIAL ECONOMY
This Comment has identified two essential differences between the audience-based and content-based analyses described above: (1) the degree
to which each requires courts to consider an author’s subjective intent,
and (2) the degree to which each allows for the possibility of exercising
jurisdiction based on an unintended but, in fact, interested audience.
These differences almost certainly lead to divergent outcomes in cases
with similar facts. To avoid outcome variability and to resolve this circuit
split, courts should adopt a unified interpretation of Calder’s expressly
aiming prong. For the same reasons, courts should also adopt a unified
standard for the effects prong. This Part presents suggestions for standardizing the Calder analysis in these two key areas.
140. Id. at 380.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., id. at 380; Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir.
2002).
146. Compare Clemens, 615 F.3d at 376–80 (focusing on the location of the activities
described and mentioning only briefly that the statements at issue were not “directed to
residents of Texas”); with Young, 315 F.3d at 262–64 (focusing on the location of the intended audience and mentioning only briefly that the statements at issue “discuss[ed] conditions in a Virginia prison”).
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First, courts should adopt a unified approach to the expressly aiming
prong, using a content-based approach. The content-based approach is
objective, promotes judicial economy, improves outcome consistency, and
satisfies the “purposeful availment” that is at the heart of minimum contacts due process analysis.147
The first reason for adopting a uniform, textual, and content-based Calder analysis is that this standard will be objective and clear. This Comment proposes that courts find that a forum state is the “focal point” or
“subject” of content when: (1) the text significantly discusses the forum
state by name, or (2) the text significantly discusses an industry or community so understood to be centered in the forum state as to signify the
forum state itself.
Significant discussion means that the text discussed either the forum
state itself (e.g. Texas) or an identifiable geographic location within that
state (e.g. Dallas). Significant discussion need not mean exclusive discussion. For example, a social media post that discusses the Washington,
D.C.-based lobbying efforts of a California businessman, on behalf of his
Silicon Valley company and the Silicon Valley community, might make
“significant mention” of both California and Washington, D.C., even if
three-fourths of the post discussed D.C. while only one-fourth discussed
Silicon Valley.
Significant discussion is not, however, only a passing or incidental mention. For example, an article that discusses the exploits of a couple at their
home in Germany and mentions only in passing that the wife was a “former Mrs. Texas” does not “significantly discuss” Texas.148 Similarly, a
social media post that discusses the DC-based lobbying efforts of a “California businessman,” that label being the only mention of California,
would not “significantly discuss” California.
If an author does not discuss a specific state or place by name, but
discusses an industry, community, or entity that is exclusively and widely
understood to be centered in that state, the state is still a focus of the
content under this proposed test.149 Examples could be the national political and lobbying industry (Washington, D.C.), Hollywood (California, as
in Calder), and perhaps the gambling industry (Nevada), or the leadership of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (Utah). These
industries or entities are so widely understood to have a connection to the
forum state that significant discussion of the industry has the same effect
as significant discussion of the state itself for expressly aiming analysis.
However, discussing industries or entities that lack common identification
with a single state, or which might be identified with several possible
147. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985).
148. See Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2005).
149. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (example of Hollywood as an industry commonly understood to be centered in California).
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states, would not satisfy the expressly aiming requirement. The standard
should be high so that courts will err on the side of not finding personal
jurisdiction where an author has chosen not to discuss the forum state by
name. Nor should courts be asked to discern whether the particular author of the content at issue would have known to associate the industry
with the forum state, as that would require excessive judicial inquiry at
the personal jurisdiction stage. But if an average American could reasonably be expected to know of the association, this would meet the
standard.
Crucially, an objective, content-based standard should not ask whether
an article is focused on the plaintiff’s activities in the forum state, as the
Fifth Circuit’s subject and sources test currently does.150 Imagine, in a
jurisdiction employing the Fifth Circuit’s test, that a Facebook post discusses this activity of a Texas resident plaintiff: sending e-mails to a resident of New York. Imagine further that the author’s article never
mentions Texas or the plaintiff’s residence there, but it does mention California, where the email’s recipient lives. The plaintiff wishes to sue in
Texas, her home state. The defendant argues that the post makes no mention of Texas but only describes e-mailing, an activity with no natural geographic locus. In response, the plaintiff argues that the activities the post
discussed (her emailing) actually did occur in the forum state.
The Fifth Circuit’s current content-based standard could lead to an absurd result in this scenario—the conclusion that a state that is never mentioned in the article, is unidentifiable from the article, and which the
author might have had no notice was even connected with the conduct he
wrote about—is the “focus” of this content. At the very least, this possibility is not completely foreclosed by the text of the Fifth Circuit’s current
test. So a court might struggle finding the correct result. If instead, the
textual, content-based test proposed above is used, the correct result is
clear, and courts need not struggle. There would be no jurisdiction in the
forum state based on this hypothetical post.
Second, this textual content-based standard will serve judicial economy. The textual, content-based test proposed here would be easy for a
court to administer. The court must simply ask whether the forum state is
significantly discussed or whether there is significant discussion of an industry that everyone understands to be associated with the forum state.
The audience-based test, by contrast, requires more complicated analysis,
potentially drawing inferences of subjective intent, and may be impossible to administer when the intended audience is national.
For example, in a local media website case like Young, determining the
locus of the intended audience is easy.151 Courts can reasonably presume
a local newspaper intends to serve its local audience.152 But if the Young
article (focusing on the Virginia activities of the Virginia resident prison
150. See Clemens, 615 F.3d at 379.
151. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262–64 (4th Cir. 2002).
152. See id. at 263.
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warden) had been posted on Facebook, the audience question is less
clear. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and other social media
platforms have national or international user bases. An individual user’s
“friends” or “followers” will often be geographically diverse. Under these
facts, it will be difficult for courts to objectively determine what, if any,
forum state’s audience was the intended recipient.153 A textual, contentbased analysis avoids this thorny inquiry in the expressly aiming prong.
Third, adopting a textual, content-based test will improve consistency
in judicial outcomes. At present, the two expressly aiming approaches
outlined above—content-based and audience-based—can yield dramatically different results. The article at issue in Young, for example, discussed a Virginia prison warden’s activities at a Virginia prison housing
Connecticut inmates.154 The article was written by a Connecticut-based
local newspaper and posted on that newspaper’s website.155 Applying its
audience-based targeting test, the Young court found no personal jurisdiction in Virginia, since the paper intended its article to be read by Connecticut subscribers.156 Under the Fifth Circuit’s content-based subject
and sources test, by contrast, the Virginia court would likely have been
able to exercise personal jurisdiction, since activities at a Virginia prison
were discussed in the article.157 Under the textual, content-based test proposed by this article, jurisdiction would be proper in Virginia—Virginia
was significantly discussed in the article—and in Connecticut, which was
also significantly discussed.
Finally, an objective textual content-based standard for Calder’s expressly aiming prong clearly shows purposeful availment, which is key to
finding the minimum contacts needed for due process. As the Young example directly above shows, the content-based test proposed by this
Comment potentially expands the number of states where personal jurisdiction would be proper. But the number of states that could exercise
personal jurisdiction—at least based on the expressly aiming prong of the
Calder analysis—would be limited by a clear, easy to determine rule that
is consistent with notice and purposeful availment. As Walden instructs,
this proposed test finds minimum contacts (based on expressly aiming)
only when the defendant choses to create them.158 The defendant’s
choice to discuss a state—or an industry commonly associated with that
state, as the defendant would or should know—firmly limits the places
where he should reasonably expect to be haled into court. Textual choices
will determine the author’s amenability to suit in a remote forum state.

153. See, e.g., Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13–10200–GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *2 (D.
Mass. July 30, 2013).
154. Young, 315 F.3d at 263–64.
155. Id. at 263.
156. See id. at 264.
157. See Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010).
158. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014).
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Though this Comment focuses on the expressly aiming prong of a Calder analysis, a standardized approach to full Calder analysis in the social
media defamation context is also needed. As briefly discussed in Part II,
courts currently differ in whether they require that the “brunt of the
harm” be suffered in the forum state or merely require that “harm” was
suffered in the forum state.159 The Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits follow the “brunt of the harm” standard.160 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit specifically rejects a “brunt of the harm” requirement, stating
that, “[i]f a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is suffered in the
forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been
suffered in another state.”161 The Ninth Circuit, making this determination, stated that it was “following Keeton, decided the same day as Calder,
in which the Court sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction in New
Hampshire even though [i]t [wa]s undoubtedly true that the bulk of the
harm done to petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire.”162
This difference, like the approach taken to the expressly aiming requirement, can be dispositive. For this reason, this circuit split must be
resolved. The best resolution will be to adopt a “significant harm” standard for the effect or harm prong of a Calder analysis. Showing significant
harm at this stage, this Comment proposes, requires the victim to credibly
allege an actual, not hypothetical, injury arising from the alleged
defamation.
Sufficient harm, not brunt of the harm, is what due process requires for
personal jurisdiction in defamation cases.163 While Calder noted that
Shirley Jones felt the “brunt of the harm” in California, the Court did not
hold in that case that the brunt of the harm was essential.164 And as the
Ninth Circuit pointed out in La League Contre Le Racisme, Keeton’s purposeful availment requirement, announced the same day as Calder, did
not compare Hustler Magazine’s New Hampshire contacts with the magazine’s contacts in other states or require the brunt of the harm in New
Hampshire.165 Using a substantial harm standard thus reconciles Calder
with Keeton.
159. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 907 (10th Cir. 2017);
IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Gizmodo Media
Grp., LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2019). But see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006). The Seventh
Circuit appears to join the Ninth in not requiring the “brunt” of the harm. See Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2010).
160. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 907; Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736
F.3d 1339, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); IMO
Indus., 155 F.3d at 265.
161. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1207.
162. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
163. See id. at 1205–08.
164. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–91 (1984).
165. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1207.
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Some might argue that the brunt of the harm standard serves to limit
potentially boundless jurisdiction when internet contacts are involved.
However, jurisdictional reach is already firmly limited by both current
audience-based and content-based approaches to expressly aiming.166
And importantly, as the Keeton court noted, a person suffers cognizable
harm when her reputation is harmed in the forum state, even if the
reputational harm is greater in another state.167 Also, the state itself has
valid interests in protecting its citizens from being misled by falsehoods.168 Because the state’s interest does not depend on the number of
persons injured in other states, this too supports the use of the sufficientharm standard rather than the brunt of the harm standard.169
In sum, to serve legal values of judicial economy, predictability, and
consistency, courts should adopt an objective, textual, and content-based
approach to the expressly aiming prong of a Calder effects-based personal jurisdiction analysis. Likewise, courts should adopt a uniform significant harm standard in the effects prong of this analysis, resolving the
present circuit split.
Looking ahead, whether the current approaches continue, courts adopt
a standard approach as recommended by this article, or some other standard approach prevails, as social media use continues to grow, courts will
increasingly apply Calder in social media defamation cases. Whatever approach is used, finding personal jurisdiction based solely on social media
contacts is a tall order. Recognizing this reality, Part V considers application of the Calder effects framework in cases this article identifies as
“pure” social media defamation cases. Pure social media defamation
cases are those where the only relevant contacts between the defendant
and the forum state are created by the social media posting itself. This
Comment identifies, for the first time, specific markers that may signal
constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts in pure social media cases.
V. MARKERS OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY SUFFICIENT TO
HALE A USER INTO COURT IN PURE SOCIAL
MEDIA DEFAMATION CASES
Several courts have recently applied Calder’s “effects” framework to
claims of social media defamation.170 This rule emerges from those cases:
166. Exercise of jurisdiction is already narrowly limited by courts’ restrictive interpretations of the expressly aiming prong in internet cases. See discussion supra Part III, Section
IV.A.
167. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984).
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. E.g., Miller v. Gizmodo Media Grp., LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1373 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (Twitter); Gilmore v. Jones, 370 F. Supp. 3d 630, 658 (W.D. Va. 2019), motion to
certify appeal granted, No. 3:18-CV-00017, 2019 WL 4417490 (W.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2019)
(YouTube); Edwards v. Schwartz, 378 F. Supp. 3d 468, 494–95 (W.D. Va. 2019) (Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube); Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (E.D. Mich.
2019) (Twitter); Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13–10200–GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *2 (D.
Mass. July 30, 2013) (Facebook).
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“[M]erely posting a defamatory statement about the plaintiff [on social
media] is not enough to hale the poster into the state where the plaintiff
resides; instead, the poster’s conduct must have involved the plaintiff’s
state in some additional way.”171
Often, the required additional conduct is supplied by non-social media
contacts with the forum state, like e-mails, letters, visits, or ongoing business relationships.172 These can be thought of as “mixed” social media
cases. For example, had Calder occurred in the internet age and via a
social media posting rather than print publication, it would have been a
mixed case—in addition to publishing the article itself, the article’s author made phone calls to third persons in California to interview sources
and share his draft, pre-publication.173
In contrast, pure social media cases have no other relevant contacts
with the forum state. These cases present harder questions of personal
jurisdiction than do mixed cases. Pure social media cases are not squarely
addressed by Calder, where the contacts considered were varied and numerous, or by Walden, where the relevant contact was singular but (unlike defamation) did not occur in the plaintiff’s home state.174 Perhaps
because neither Calder nor Walden suggests exactly what minimum contacts are in a pure social media defamation context,175 courts have been
reluctant to find personal jurisdiction based solely on tweets, posts, and
similar communications.176 Seeking to adequately protect a defendant’s
due process, courts err on the side of not exercising personal
jurisdiction.177
It is clear that merely mentioning the forum state in the text of the post
when another state is also mentioned is not, alone, sufficient to establish
minimum contacts.178 This result is consistent with the textual contentbased approach proposed in Part IV (which suggests substantial discussion of the forum state, but not passing mention, satisfies expressly aiming at the forum state). Admittedly, it may be difficult to determine what
constitutes “substantial” discussion in text as brief as a tweet. Twitter now
allows users to post up to 280 characters, though most tweets use fewer
171. Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 857 (emphasis added).
172. E.g., Edwards, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 495–96.
173. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785–86 (1984).
174. See id. at 788–90; Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 287–88 (2014).
175. See generally Cromer Young, supra note 100, at 763–65.
176. E.g., Miller v. Gizmodo Media Grp., LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (finding no jurisdiction over nonresident defendant based on a Tweet); Edwards, 378
F. Supp. 3d at 494–95 (no jurisdiction based on the social media contacts); Vangheluwe, 365
F. Supp. 3d at 857 (no jurisdiction over two of three defendants).
177. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience
of plaintiffs or third parties.”).
178. See Edwards, 378 F. Supp. 3d. at 494 (finding no jurisdiction in Virginia based on a
social media post that mentioned Virginia when the post’s main focus was the Flint Water
Crisis); Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 857 (finding no jurisdiction in Michigan when a
Tweet mentioned Virginia, Michigan, and Ohio).
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than 140.179 If mentioning a state uses four to twelve of those characters,
that could be both a substantial portion of the text and a passing mention.
In these situations, courts will have to use their common sense and look
at whether the mention of the forum state is critical to the meaning of the
tweet, or merely incidental.
Nonetheless, finding personal jurisdiction in pure social media cases is
possible.180 In pure social media defamation cases the key question is
this: What “additional” content within the social media post itself is sufficient “contact with the forum state” to satisfy Calder? One court has suggested that, “[f]or instance, the [social media] posting might be of more
interest to people in the plaintiff’s state than nationally. Or . . . the post
might be of no special interest to those in the plaintiff’s state but the
poster makes special effort to publicize the post there.”181
Unfortunately, these suggestions are vague and essentially restate the
audience-based and content-based expressly aiming tests already in
use.182 For example, a warning that users who post content of special interest to people in the forum state doesn’t provide those users fair notice—which due process requires—of the specific conduct based on which
the user should expect to be haled into court in that state. Individuals
need more specific guidance. Courts also need guidance so they can apply
Calder consistently and correctly in the social media context.
To more specifically answer this question and answer this need, this
Comment identifies, for the first time, social media “markers” that may
indicate express aiming at the forum state. Courts can look for these
markers to indicate the rare circumstances in which social media contacts
alone will support exercise of personal jurisdiction. While an individualized, full Calder analysis will always be required, the presence of one or
more markers may indicate a court is more likely to find it can exercise
personal jurisdiction.
A. DOXING
A first marker showing constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts is
“doxing.” Doxing, the malicious online sharing of a person’s identifying
information, can be social media content sufficiently “focused” on the
victim’s home state for that state to hale the out-of-state social media user
into court.183 Doxing differs from other exposures of personal information online in two key ways.184 First, doxing discloses physical, real world
179. Aliza Rosen & Ikuhiro Ihara, Giving You More Characters to Express Yourself,
TWITTER: BLOG (Sept. 26, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2017/Giving-you-more-characters-to-express-yourself.html [https://perma.cc/CTU3-WD7S].
180. Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 857 (finding personal jurisdiction based solely on a
Tweet).
181. Id. at 857–58.
182. See supra Part III.
183. See Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59. For additional information on doxing,
alternatively spelled “doxxing” or “d0xing,” see David M. Douglas, Doxing: A Conceptual
Analysis, 18 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 199, 199–05 (2016).
184. See Douglas, supra note 183, at 200–01.
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contact information, like an address or school/work location, not email or
online contact information.185 Second, doxing discloses current and specific identifying information, so that persons nearby wishing to take action against the exposed individual can presently locate them.186
For example, in Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, the court considered
defamation claims brought by an individual who was briefly misidentified
by internet activists as the driver who killed Charlottesville, Virginia protestor Heather Heyer on August 12, 2017.187 In the frenzied minutes following Heyer’s murder, online news outlets and activists searched public
records for the car that struck Heyer.188 Based on records listing the car’s
previous owner, internet sources publicly identified Joel Vangheluwe, a
twenty-year-old Michigan resident, as the driver; however, he was, in fact,
unconnected to the Charlottesville protests.189 “By the evening of the attack,” the court noted, “James Alex Fields Jr. was [correctly] identified as
the driver of the Challenger,” the car that killed Heyer and wounded 19
others.190 However, “a few hours is a long time in today’s world of . . .
social media.”191 That afternoon, Joel and his family received “countless
anonymous threats.”192 “Michigan State police were notified and the
family was warned to leave their home.”193 Numerous users “took to
Facebook and Twitter,” some doxing Joel and his family.194 Once the
chaos died down, Joel sued several of these users for defamation, filing in
Michigan.195
Three nonresident defendants challenged whether the Michigan court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over them based solely on their social
media posts.196 Each defendant tweeted about Joel, his father, or an online news story identifying Joel as the killer.197 Each was a resident of
another state and had no other relevant contacts with the state of Michigan.198 So these were pure social media cases.
The court found that two defendants could not be haled into court
based on their tweets or their posts.199 For one defendant, the court noted
the tweet at issue was merely a link to an online news article claiming Joel
was the killer.200 The tweet was thus “one step (or one hyperlink) re185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 860.
See id.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 863.

718

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

moved from” the allegedly defamatory article.201 This indirect content,
the court found, was not sufficiently directed at Michigan residents.202
The second defendant’s tweet is discussed in Section V.B and also did not
justify personal jurisdiction.
By contrast, a third defendant could be haled into court based on a
tweet that directly doxed Joel Vangheluwe. Her tweet, unlike other users’
tweets that merely identified Joel as the killer or that shared or retweeted
other posts that included such information, directly (though not exclusively) posted Joel’s family’s “home address (street number, street, city,
state, and zip code).”203 Clarifying that it was not holding “that all doxing
amounts to constitutionally minimum contacts with the forum state,” the
court drew a distinction between doxing that “disclos[es] a person’s online information (e.g., their Facebook username)” and that which discloses a “physical, not virtual, address.”204 Disclosure of online identity, it
noted, plausibly aims to facilitate “some sort of cyberattack (e.g., plastering [the victim’s] Facebook wall with hateful comments).”205 Disclosure
of physical address location, however, more likely envisions a localized
response. “True,” the court noted, “people from across the nation (indeed, world) could have used the physical address to say, send the
Vangheluwes hate mail. But who could most readily visit Vangheluwes’
residence? Michiganders.206 Consistent with that possibility,” the court
continued, “Michigan State police were notified [of threats] and the family was warned to leave their home.”207 In sum, the court found, “it [was]
plausible that [this user] intended to pique Michiganders’ interest with
her tweet.”208 Because her tweet was expressly aimed at Michigan, she
could be haled into court in that state based only on that contact.209
As this case shows, not all doxing justifies personal jurisdiction under
the Calder effects framework.210 To begin, the post must be direct—not a
secondhand link or “share”—to show requisite intentional targeting by
the poster.211 Next, only doxing tending to elicit a local, on-the-ground
response in the forum state (as opposed to a purely online response) creates sufficient contacts with the forum state under the Calder effects
framework.212 Nevertheless, doxing is clearly a strong marker that shows
that social media content has been expressly aimed at residents of the
forum state, creating constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts.213
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 861.
See id. at 860.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 863.
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B. TAGGING, HASHTAGS, OR SHOUTOUTS RELATED
TO THE FORUM STATE
A second, more common marker of expressly aiming in social media
cases is use of the symbols “@” and “#” to create state-focused tagging
and hashtags. Plaintiffs commonly argue that because they live in the forum state and have the bulk of their friends, business, and reputation in
that state, content discussing them personally is expressly aimed at an
audience in their home state.214 Courts reject this argument when the
content in question is not geographically focused, specifically discusses
activities or issues focused on other states, and does not specifically focus
on plaintiff’s home state.215 Tagging and hashtags that do address the
plaintiff’s home state can change the analysis.
First, courts can look for the presence of tagging or mentions, which
are indicated by use of the “@” symbol. Social media platforms allow
users to tag or mention—specially direct comments at—other users
through use of @ followed by another user or page’s name.216 As one
social media professional puts it: “Using the @ tag signifies to someone
that you’re talking about them, giving them a head’s up about something,
and/or would like them to respond. . . . If you’re at an event and you hear
someone using your name or they call out to you, that’s equivalent to
using an @ tag.”217 Where a user tags or mentions other users or accounts
associated with the forum state the content is expressly aimed.
Second, courts can look for the presence of forum state related
hashtags or shoutouts. Hashtags, represented by # followed by a string of
unbroken words or characters, allow social media users to connect their
individual content to a larger topic or theme.218 A user appends a hashtag
and the hashtagged post can then be viewed in a single feed with all other
identically tagged posts.219 Using hashtags has been described as “indicat[ing] that you want to participate in a larger, ongoing conversation—
[about] for example, a conference . . . or a popular subject.”220 Shoutouts
214. E.g., Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining plaintiff
was a well-known resident of Texas and defendant knew of his Texas residence); Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13-10200-GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *2 (D. Mass. July 30, 2013) (explaining defendant knew plaintiff’s state of residence and should expect her Facebook post
about him would be of special interest to Facebook friends in that state).
215. See, e.g., Clemens, 615 F.3d at 380; Edwards v. Schwartz, 378 F. Supp. 3d. 468, 494
(W.D. Va. 2019); Vangheluwe, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 860.
216. See What Is Tagging and How Does It Work?, FACEBOOK: HELP CENTER, https://
www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337 [https://perma.cc/Q2GS-2FB6]; About Mentions
and Replies, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/mentionsand-replies [https://perma.cc/PY2K-2RV8].
217. Courtney Hunt, Understanding and Using # Tags and @ Tags, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (July 6, 2015), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/courtney-hunt/
2015-07-06/understanding-and-using-tags-and-tags [https://perma.cc/7MTJ-WVER].
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., #Shoutout Search Results, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/search?
q=shoutout&src=typed_query [https://perma.cc/JKK8-TA9P]; How Do I Use Hashtags on
Instagram?, INSTAGRAM: HELP CENTER, https://help.instagram.com/351460621611097
[https://perma.cc/8NES-W4CT].
220. Hunt, supra note 217.
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do the same in promotion of another user or business.221 While using a
hashtag related to the forum state would not as directly address the content to an audience in the forum state as would tagging, it would show
that there is a likelihood that a user is “making specific efforts to promote
the post” in that state.222
An example of a case where hashtags or tagging could have made a
difference for personal jurisdiction based on social media contacts is Edwards v. Schwartz.223 In this case, a Virginia Tech professor speaking out
about the Flint, Michigan, lead-contaminated water crisis brought a defamation suit against a group of Flint residents and academics working with
these residents.224 The residents had complained online about his techniques and sought to end his involvement with the issue.225 The Flint residents and academics tweeted and posted Facebook messages critical of
the professor and his work in Flint.226 The court applied the Fourth Circuit’s targeting test, finding that there was no evidence that the specific,
individual tweets and posts were specifically intended for an audience in
Virginia.227 Though the Flint residents’ overall goal was to influence the
professor’s colleagues, many of whom lived and worked in Virginia, the
individual posts considered by the court lacked that specific focus.228 Furthermore, the “focus” of the social media comments the court considered
was the professor’s work on the Flint water crisis.229 The posts, the court
found, were thus focused on Michigan, not Virginia.230 Even though one
post mentioned Virginia by name, the court found it could not exercise
personal jurisdiction for these defamation claims.231
However, in a hypothetical scenario based on Edwards, had the allegedly defamatory live tweets or posts about the professor’s Flint water crisis work included “@VirginiaTech” or “@ViriginaChemicalEngineers”
tags, for example, the content would likely have been expressly aimed at
a Virginia audience.232 Hypothetical hashtags, based on the Edwards
case, showing efforts to promote posts in Virginia might include
“#VirginiaIsForScience” or “#VirginiansStandWithFlint.” Virginia-fo221. See #Shoutout Search Results, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/search?q=shoutout&
src=typed_query [https://perma.cc/JKK8-TA9P].
222. See Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 864 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
223. See 378 F. Supp. 3d 468, 478–79 (W.D. Va. 2019).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 489, 495.
227. See id. at 494–95. Interestingly, Edwards is both a pure social media case and a
case in the Calder mode of mixed contacts. In Edwards, social media posts and additional
contacts with the forum state—including a letter sent by Flint activists to the president of
Virginia Tech—were at issue. See id. at 479. The court, however, considered each individual
contact separately to find whether the court could exercise personal jurisdiction for defamation claims based on each. Id. at 494–98. The social media statements, therefore, were
considered in isolation—making Edwards a pure social media case in relevant part.
228. See id. at 494–95.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 494.
232. See id. at 494–95.
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cused tagging, hashtags, or shoutouts could have provided the “something
more” the court needed to determine that Virginia was a focus of the
content and that it could exercise personal jurisdiction based on the
tweets.
Hashtags, shoutouts, or tagging will not be determinative if they point
toward multiple states or, of course, where they point away from the
plaintiff’s home state.233 But where they are the only significant geographic marker present in a tweet or post and point to the plaintiff’s
home state, they may tip the balance of an analysis.234 In Vangheluwe, for
example, the second defendant over whom the Michigan court found it
could not exercise personal jurisdiction tweeted this: “Joel Vangheluwe
from Romero, Michigan Car OHIO LICENSE PLATE # GVF 1111 2010
GRAY DODGE CHALLENGER #Charlottesville was the attacker.”235
Analyzing this content, the court noted, “[a]ll that is ‘Michigan’ about
that tweet is the statement that Joel is from Romero, Michigan.”236 And
“a reader of the tweet is immediately pulled from Michigan to Ohio (the
license plate number) to Virginia (‘#Charlottesville’).”237 That, the court
found, did not justify requiring the defendant to defend suit in
Michigan.238
Imagine, instead, that the tweet in question read: “Joel Vangheluwe
Car LICENSE PLATE # GVF 1111 2010 GRAY DODGE CHALLENGER #Charlottesville was the attacker.” Such a tweet would likely
establish personal jurisdiction in a Virginia court, with the hashtag serving
as a convenient marker for the reviewing court.
Hashtags, tagging, and other similar practices, while weaker markers
than doxing, may show the difference between content that is generally
aimed and content that is expressly aimed at the forum state, creating
minimum contacts.
C. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS WITH INHERENT GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS:
TRIPADVISOR, YELP, OR NEXTDOOR
Finally, courts can look at whether a social media user posted on a
platform with an inherent local geographic focus, like TripAdvisor, Yelp,
or Nextdoor. Because these platforms specifically focus on destinations,
cities, or neighborhoods, their use may be a marker of express aiming
sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction in a pure social media defamation case. This possibility was previewed in Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v.
Winchester.239 In that case, a federal district court in Missouri concluded
that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over Kansas resident Emily
Winchester, who allegedly posted defamatory comments on the plaintiff’s
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id.
See id.
Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 WL 3676962, at *3–4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2018).
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page on TripAdvisor.com.240 Emily had visited the plaintiff’s Branson,
Missouri, “Bigfoot Safari Tour” and posted a mildly negative review
about her experience.241
Applying the Calder framework, the Bigfoot on the Strip court found
that Emily’s online comments
were intentionally aimed at Missouri because they were posted on
[the Bigfoot Tour’s] page on TripAdvisor[,] . . . review[ed] . . . the
services provided [at the Tour’s] sole business location in Missouri[,]
. . . [and] potential visitors consulting TripAdvisor about the Tour
would look at the page devoted exclusively to the Tour. Therefore,
these intentional statements were ‘uniquely or expressly aimed’ at
Missouri.242
Bigfoot on the Strip is neither a social media case243 nor a pure internet
contacts case,244 but it suggests interesting questions about the use of social media with an inherent geographic focus. In 2018, TripAdvisor added
a social media component.245 What would happen if a person posting defamatory comments on TripAdvisor’s social media arm had not visited
the attraction themselves but instead relied on secondhand information
given to them by a friend or family member? What if a friend using that
platform saw Emily’s review and shared it to her own network, adding
her own allegedly defamatory comment? Has this friend expressly aimed
defamatory content at Missouri? The “direct” (posting) vs. “indirect”
(sharing) distinction made by the court in Vangheluwe suggests such comments made on most social media platforms would not suffice.246 But the
Bigfoot court found that the inherent geographic focus of TripAdvisor
made content posted there more expressly aimed at the state than would
be the same content posted in a general forum.247 This suggests courts
applying an audience-based express aiming test might uphold personal
jurisdiction for “locally oriented” social media posts on platforms like
Yelp, TripAdvisor, or Nextdoor, when they would not find jurisdiction
justified by the same content on Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.248 For
this reason, courts using an audience-focused approach can use a post’s
240. Id. at *4
241. Id. at *1–2.
242. Id. at *3.
243. See id. at *3–4. Emily Winchester posted her review on the attraction’s
TripAdvisor page rather than sharing it on social media. Id. at *3.
244. See id. at *3 (“Emily is [also] alleged to have traveled to Missouri and visited the
Tour.”).
245. The New TripAdvisor Goes Social, Gets Personal, TRIPADVISOR (Sept. 17, 2018),
http://ir.tripadvisor.com/news-releases/news-release-details/new-tripadvisor-goes-socialgets-personal [https://perma.cc/9JT9-3GZG].
246. See Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 863 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
247. See Bigfoot on the Strip, 2018 WL 3676962, at *4.
248. See Edwards v. Schwartz, 378 F. Supp. 3d 468, 495 (W.D. Va. 2019) (suggesting a
different analysis where social media platforms have specific geographic focus) (“Neither
the statements themselves nor the social media platforms from which they were published
uniquely target Virginia or would have inherently included a substantial number of Virginia residents or businesses.”).
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location on TripAdvisor, Yelp, Nextdoor, or similar sites as a marker of
potential personal jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, what are your forum options if you, like Joel Vangheluwe,
are a victim of social media defamation? You can always sue in the defendant’s home state.249 But this may be inconvenient for the injured plaintiff. While concerns about unbounded forum exposure due to the diffuse
“effects” of internet speech will ensure that courts continue to take a restrictive approach to haling out-of-state defendants into their courts
based on internet speech, courts can clarify and standardize their interpretations of Calder to maximize clarity for system participants and make
sure that effects-based personal jurisdiction properly fulfils due process
requirements.
Due process requires that a person have fair notice of the conduct that
is likely to result in her being haled into a distant court.250 Moreover, due
process requires that the defendant’s own actions, not the unilateral actions of another, create the minimum contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction.251 Adopting an objective, textual, and content-based standard
for the expressly aiming prong of a Calder analysis and a significant harm
standard for the effects prong in social media defamation cases serves
these due process requirements. Unlike current audience-based approaches like the Fourth Circuit’s, the text-based content test proposed
by this Comment eliminates the need for tricky and subjective audienceintent determinations, which are especially unclear for content posted to
a general social media site like Twitter. And unlike the Fifth Circuit’s
current content-based test, under which an author of allegedly defamatory content could be subject to personal jurisdiction in a place that she
had no idea she was creating minimum contacts with, the proposed textbased test finds minimum contacts only where the defendant herself has
purposefully created them.
Furthermore—and whichever version of the Calder effects framework
courts ultimately apply—a personal jurisdiction analysis guided by specific markers like doxing, tagging, hashtags, or geographically focused
platforms will also serve due process by giving social media users fair
notice of what specific online conduct might create minimum contacts.
In the end, to provide certainty for plaintiffs wondering if they can sue
in their home forum state, and to assist lower courts struggling to apply
unclear and contradictory interpretations of Calder, the Supreme Court
should watch for an appropriate vehicle in which to define the “floor” of
Calder jurisdiction.252 Given the ubiquity of social media today and social
249. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
251. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014).
252. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, K.G.S. v. Facebook, Inc., 294 So.3d
122 (Ala. 2019) (No. 19-910), cert. denied, 2020 WL 2105265, at *1 (May 4, 2020).
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media’s importance in modern communication, such a case shouldn’t be
long in coming. Clarifying Calder’s minimum requirements in pure social
media cases will give social media users fair notice of when their choices
to tweet, post, or share content may justify haling them into a defamation
victim’s home court.

